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ARGUMENT 
L FOR ANY WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE TO OCCUR UNDER UTAH R. EV. 504(d), THE 
CLIENT MUST ASSERT A CLAIM. AS DISTINGUISHED 
FROM A MERE DEFENSE, WHICH PLACES AT ISSUE THE 
NATURE OF THE PRIVILEGED MATERIAL; OR THE 
CLIENT MUST ASSERT A BREACH OF DUTY BY THE 
ATTORNE Y. 
The Defendants C. William Bacon and Central Utah Clinic correctly state 
that the attorney-client privilege may be waived by the client, and correctly state 
that a party impliedly waives his right to assert the privilege "by putting the 
lawyer's performance at issue during the course of the litigation." (Brief for 
Defendants at p. 9.) But then they go on to suggest - citing no Utah case law 
whatsoever - that such a waiver occurs where the client asserts a claim or defense 
which places at issue the nature of the privileged material. It is respectfully 
submitted that, where as here the clients have not affirmatively "put the lawyer's 
performance at issue," but merely defended against the opposing parties' 
allegations regarding the attorney's conduct, no effective waiver of the attorney-
client privilege has taken place which will permit the attorney to reveal 
confidential statements made to him during the course of the representation. On 
this and other bases, all of the cases cited by the Defendants are distinguishable 
from the facts in the instant case. 
1 
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In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2005), was a criminal case where the 
District Court held that the defendant's claim of actual innocence impliedly 
waived the attorney-client privilege "to the extent necessary for the Respondent to 
defend the actual innocence claim." Id. at 448. In reversing, the Court of Appeals 
held that "The District Court's order is clear error as a matter of law," id. at 452, 
and "constitutes a departure from existing law for which we find no precedent. It 
undermines the historically strong protections of the attorney-client privilege." Id. 
at 448. Significantly, the question whether there was an implied waiver of the 
privilege came up at all only because the client made an affirmative claim of actual 
innocence. Thus, In re Lott may properly be read as holding that even if the client 
makes such an affirmative claim which implicates the attorney-client privilege, 
such a claim will not necessarily support an implied waiver of the privilege. 
In Beery v. Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 599 (S. D. 
Ohio 2003), as with In re Lott, supra, the District Court determined that there was 
no implied waiver of the privilege. Berry was a patent infringement suit where the 
client asserted in his deposition that he never asserted any patent infringement 
claim without seeking the advice of an attorney, and the District Court correctly 
held that such an assertion did not impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege to 
enable the opposing party to seek privileged information from the client's 
2 
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attorney. In Berry, the party seeking the implied waiver suggested that "[i]t is 
unfair, inconsistent and contrary to law for Mr. Berry to claim infringement on the 
one hand, while withholding as privileged the basis that claim on the other." Id at 
605. The Court, while acknowledging "some degree of unfairness and 
inconsistency" in Mr. Berry's position, id., nevertheless was unwilling to find any 
implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege under the facts of that case. 
In In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 459, 470 
(S.D.N. Y. 1996), the District Court properly held that communications to 
attorneys which had already been extrajudicially published would waive the 
attorney-client privilege as to those communications. The Defendants make no 
claim in the instant case that there has at any time been any "extrajudicial 
publication" of the alleged settlement agreement. 
In United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1992), the 
defendant was prosecuted for violations of the securities laws, and at trial, he 
argued that he did not intend to violate the securities laws, but believed the 
financing structure of the transactions would allow him legally to avoid 
disclosures regarding other investors, and that describing the source of his funds 
as "personal" was lawful. He also filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling that 
would permit him to testify regarding his belief in the lawfulness of describing the 
3 
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source of his funds as "personal" without being subjected to cross-examination on 
communications he had with his attorney on the subject. The District Court 
denied the motion in limine, opining that if the defendant testified regarding his 
good faith on the legality of the disclosure, it would open the door to cross-
examination with respect to the basis for his belief, and that such cross-
examination would allow inquiry into communications with his attorney. In 
affirming this ruling the Second Circuit determined that "a defendant may not use 
the privilege to prejudice his opponent's case or to disclose some selected 
communications for self-serving purposes." Id. at 1292. Unlike the situation in 
Siberian, here the clients took no affirmative steps whatsoever to put his 
attorney's advice before the Court. Instead, they merely denied that they had 
agreed at any time to any settlement of their case. 
Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2de 232 (8th Cir. 1974), also cited by the 
Defendants, merely restates the traditional view that a party cannot call into public 
question the competence of his attorney without impliedly waiving the privilege. 
In Tasby, a criminal case, the client made various allegations of misconduct and 
incompetence against his attorney, and the Eighth Circuit rightly held that such 
allegations impliedly waived the attorney client privilege. Here, it is important to 
point out that the clients made no allegations of misconduct or incompetence 
4 
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against their attorney, limiting their testimony to factual assertions regarding 
whether they had entered into any settlement of the case. 
It is true that the clients here did not - and indeed they could not - agree to 
a settlement of their case which they testified they had never assented to. It is also 
true that the Defendants thereafter were fully entitled to move the court for 
enforcement of the alleged settlement. The only issue is whether the clients, by 
the mere act of defending against that motion by asserting no settlement was ever 
agreed to by them, impliedly waived the attorney client privilege, thus permitting 
their own attorney to testify against them at the hearing. 
The record in this case is simply devoid of even a scintilla of evidence that 
the clients at any time expressly alleged any breach of a duty owed to them by 
their former attorney, and in the absence of any such allegation, Rule 504(d)(3) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence cannot be used to support any implied waiver of the 
privilege. This is not a case where the clients have attacked their former attorney 
or asserted any improper misconduct by their attorney. Rather, the record reflects 
only that the clients have a decidedly different recollection than their former 
attorney as to whether any settlement was actually reached. Such a 
misunderstanding between the attorneys and the clients, without an express 
allegation by the clients that the attorney has breached a duty to them, cannot form 
5 
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the basis for any implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege and it is 
respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeals should so hold. 
II. IF THERE IS A VALID AGREEMENT THAT A CASE SHALL 
BE SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION, A SETTLEMENT OF 
THE CASE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED TO 
WRITING MAY NOT BE ENFORCED. 
The Defendants further argue that the Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
Reese v. Tingey, 111 P.2d 605 (Utah 2008), to the effect that settlements in 
mediated eases must be reduced to writing, should not be extended to the instant 
case because the Plaintiffs below failed to raise that issue before the trial court. It 
is submitted that this issue may be mooted, in some degree, by this Court's very 
recent ruling in Stewart v. Bova, 2011 UT App. 129 (Filed April 21, 2011), a copy 
of which is included in the Addendum1. There, the Court of Appeals expressly 
held that an agreement to arbitrate a medical malpractice dispute must, to be 
enforceable, comply with the specific requirements of the arbitration statute of the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-3-401 to -422 
(2008). 
All parties in the instant case acknowledge that the Plaintiff Glade Terry 
1The opinion in Stewart was handed down some ten days after the filing of 
the Plaintiffs' opening brief herein. 
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signed an agreement to submit the dispute herein to arbitration, and by Order filed 
November 13,-2007, the court ordered the proceedings stayed as to Defendant 
Utah Regional Medical Center. All parties asserted reliance on the Plaintiffs 
agreement to submit the case to arbitration. (R. 20, 27, 30). At issue in Stewart 
was whether the arbitration agreement admittedly signed by a patient was 
unenforceable for failure to comply with the express provisions of the arbitration 
statute. While that is not the precise issue here, Stewart establishes the rule that 
once arbitration has been elected, any settlement in a case referred to arbitration 
must strictly comply with the provisions of the arbitration statutes in order to be 
enforceable. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-418(2)(a), the appointed panel 
which adjudicates a medical malpractice claim must "render its opinion in writing 
not later than 30 days after the end of the proceedings . . ." . No such written 
opinion was ever entered in this case and, despite the express requirements of the 
statute, the case was settled without any written memorialization whatsoever 
signed by either an arbitration panel or by the parties. As noted by the Court of 
Appeals in Stewart, "our task is to interpret the words used by the legislature, not 
to correct or revise them." Stewart at f 21. Given the rationale for the holding in 
Stewart, it is apparent that, if there was a binding agreement to arbitrate the case, 
then any disposition thereafter must be in writing to be enforceable. Thus, the 
7 
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appropriate resolution in this case is to void the alleged oral agreement, to remand 
the case to the District Court for further proceedings to consider the arbitration 
issues, and finally to enter a disposition in the case based upon the writing 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-418(2)(a). 
In the alternative, the Court of Appeals should reject the Defendants' 
position that the Plaintiff s argument for an extension of the holding in Reese v. : 
Tingey, 111 P.3d 605 (Utah 2008) to the facts in this case is a "newly raised 
argument" that may not be considered for the first time on appeal. First, the Reese 
case was not even decided until February 1, 2008, more than four months after the. 
instant case was filed with the District Court. Second, shortly after the filing of 
the case, on November 13, 2007, the proceedings were stayed to enable the parties 
to conduct the arbitration, which was initiated but never in fact actually conducted. 
Finally, following the motion of the Defendants to enforce an alleged settlement, 
the Court disposed of the entire case by ruling that such a settlement had occurred. 
In short, the Plaintiffs did not have any real opportunity at any time to raise any 
additional arguments; consequently, they should not now be barred from raising 
this purely legal issue on appeal for the first time. 
The Defendants are flatly wrong in asserting that "only settlement 
agreements in mediation or that implicate the statue of frauds are required to be 
8 
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reduced to writing in any other litigation context." (Appelles Brief at 16-17) As 
set forth above, if the parties have properly elected arbitration, the Utah arbitration 
statutes also mandate that any finally determined award be reduced to writing. 
Given this requirement, and the fact that the parties purported to submit the case to 
arbitration, the arbitration rules should be strictly applied and the alleged 
settlement herein should be declared void for its failure to comply with the 
arbitration statute. 
The Plaintiffs believe that the remaining issues on appeal have been 
adequately addressed in their opening brief. 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted that the Court of 
Appeals should hold (a) that the Plaintiffs did not impliedly waive the attorney-
client privilege in this case and their former attorney should not have been 
permitted to testify against them in support of the putative settlement; (b) that, if 
the parties validly entered into an agreement or agreements to submit this case to 
arbitration, the lack of any written settlement agreement voids the putative 
settlement; (c) that there was no meeting of the minds regarding any settlement 
9 
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between the parties; and (d) that the putative settlement allegedly reached by the 
parties, pursuant to which the Plaintiffs receive virtually no compensation for the 
Plaintiff Glade Terry's substantial injuries, should shock the conscience of the 
court. Accordingly, this case should be reversed and remanded for arbitration or 
trial on the merits of the case. 
DATED this 11th day of July, 2011. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
TftQmas N. Th 
Attorney for Plaint 
r*i piuu<{ mou 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
Glenna Stewart v. Charles Bova, M.D., and Pioneer Valley Hospital, 2011 
UT App. 129 (Slip Op. Filed April 21, 2011). 
12 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—00O00— 
Glenna Stewart, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
• v . 
Charles Bova, M.D., and Pioneer Valley 
Hospital, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
OPINION 
Case No. 20100036-CA 
F I L E D 
(April 21, 2011) 
2011 UTApp 129 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 090900273 
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy 
Attorneys: Shawn P. Bailey, Logan; and Clark Newhall, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Kurt M. Frankenburg, Stephen T. Hester, Brian P. Miller, Kenneth L. 
Reich, and Christopher W. Droubay, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Voros. 
VOROS, Judge: 
11 The question presented by this appeal is whether an agreement to arbitrate a 
medical malpractice dispute must, to be enforceable, comply with the specific 
requirements of the arbitration statute of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-3-401 to -422 (2008). We hold that it must. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BACKGROUND 
12 On September 16, 2008, Glenna Stewart underwent a lumbar nerve root injection 
at Pioneer Valley Hospital. The procedure was performed by Dr. Charles Bova. Ms. 
Stewart was accompanied by her daughter, a registered nurse. 
13 According to Ms. Stewart's declaration, at the hospital she was led to a treatment 
room and instructed to change into a hospital gown. Ms. Stewart was in "a lot of pain" 
and was 'Very anxious/' A nurse came into the room with a "stack of papers'" and told 
Ms. Stewart to sign them. However, Ms. Stewart noticed a different patient's name on 
the top page of the stack of papers and pointed this fact out to the nurse. The nurse 
brought a new stack of papers and pointed.to specific pages for Ms. Stewart to sign, 
Ms. Stewart signed them. Ms. Stewart was then moved to another room and placed on 
a table in preparation for the injection. Just before the injection, Ms. Stewart was 
presented with another paper to sign. She believes that this may have been an 
arbitration agreement. According to her declaration, Ms. Stewart was not given an 
explanation about the contents of any of the papers she signed. In particular, she was 
not encouraged to ask questions about the arbitration agreement or given a chance to 
read it before signing. The day after the injection, Ms. Stewart saw Dr. Bova for a 
follow-up appointment and signed a second arbitration agreement. The two arbitration 
agreements are identical.1 Ms. Stewart declares that she received copies of neither. Her 
daughter later stated in an affidavit, "If I had known that there was an arbitration 
agreement in the documents given to my Mother to sign, I would have instructed her 
not to sign it." 
14 According to his declaration, Dr. Bova reviewed the Agreement with Ms. Stewart 
and her daughter prior to the injection. In addition, he answered all of Ms. Stewart's 
questions regarding the Agreement and confirmed that Ms. Stewart understood the 
terms of the Agreement. Dr. Bova then observed Ms. Stewart sign the Agreement. Dr. 
Bova does not, however, contend that Ms. Stewart was verbally encouraged to read the 
materials or to ask any questions. 
1. For simplicity, we refer to the two identical arbitration agreements collectively as 
"the Agreement." 
9m nnr«fi-c A 2 
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^5 Following the injection, Ms. Stewart experienced a loss of sensation and motor 
function in her leg. She sued Dr. Bova, alleging medical malpractice. Dr. Bova moved 
to stay the court action and to compel arbitration as required by the Agreement. Ms. 
Stewart responded that the Agreement is invalid because (1) she was not verbally 
encouraged to read the materials or ask questions; (2) she was not given a copy of the 
Agreement; (3) she was not given the written information required by section 78B-3-
421(l)(a) of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act; and (4) the Agreement is 
unconscionable. The trial court denied Dr. Bova's motion. It ruled that no question of 
fact existed as to whether Dr. Bova had verbally encouraged plaintiff, to read the 
Agreement and to ask any questions. Consequently, it ruled that the Agreement was 
not validly executed under section 78B-3-421. The trial court did not address whether 
the Agreement was otherwise unconscionable. Dr. Bova appeals.2 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 Dr. Bova raises several issues on appeal, but they all resolve into a single 
question: whether the Agreement is enforceable under section 78B-3-421, the arbitration 
provision of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. "The interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law that we review for correctness . . . ." Jaques v. Midway Auto Plaza, Inc., 
2010 UT 54,111, 240 R3d 769. 
2. Notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Bova's appeal does not arise from a final judgment 
or order, we have jurisdiction over it pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11429(l)(a) 
(2008). That section provides that "an appeal may be taken from ... an order denying a 
motion to compel arbitration." Id.; see also Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999.UT 54, f 17, 982 P.2d 
572 (holding that a party may seek review of any order denying a motion to compel 
arbitration, irrespective of whether the order is a final judgment or has been designated 
as such under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)). 
20100036-CA 3 
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ANALYSIS 
The Agreement Was Not Validly Executed 
%7 Generally speaking, "[i]t is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in 
favor of arbitration, in keeping with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of 
disputes when the parties have agreed not to litigate/7 Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. 
Parkwest Assocs.f 2002 UT 3,116, 40 P.3d 599 (internal quotation marks omitted). And 
while "no public policy requires such agreements to be subjected to a different analysis 
when they are between physicians and patients," Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 
1996), the Utah Legislature has by statute established specific requirements for the valid 
execution of an arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 (2008). These requirements include terms that must be 
contained in the arbitration agreement, information the patient must be provided in 
writing, and information the patient must be verbally told. Id. At issue here is this last 
requirement, what the patient must be told: 
(1) After May 2,1999, for a binding arbitration agreement 
. between a patient and a health care provider to be validly 
executed. . . : 
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to: 
(i) read the written information required by 
Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration agreement; and 
(ii) ask any questions. 
Id. § 78B-3-421(l)(c). The written information required by subsection (l)(a) includes the 
patient's waiver of the right to have a claim heard by a judge or jury; the patient's 
responsibility, if any, for the costs of arbitration; the patient's right to decline arbitration 
and still receive treatment; the automatic renewal of the arbitration agreement; and the 
patient's right to rescind the arbitration agreement within ten days. See id. § 78B-3-
421(l)(a). 
^8 Ms. Stewart does not deny that she signed the Agreement. The Agreement 
provides that she will resolve any claim against Dr. Bova by negotiation, mediation, or 
arbitration. It also contains a provision reciting that she had the right to ask questions 
about the arbitration agreement: 
20100036-CA 4 
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I have received a written explanation of the terms of this 
Agreement. I have had the right to ask questions and have 
my questions answered. I understand that any Claim I might 
have must be resolved through the dispute resolution 
process in this Agreement instead of having them [sic] heard 
by a judge or jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators 
and the manner in which they are selected. I understand the 
responsibility for arbitration related costs. I understand that 
this Agreement renews each year unless cancelled before the 
renewal date. I understand that I can decline to enter into 
the Agreement and still receive health care. I understand that 
I can rescind this Agreement within 10 days of signing it. 
However, Dr. Bova does not contend that Ms. Stewart was verbally encouraged to read 
the written information required by subsection (l)(a) and the Agreement or to ask any 
questions. 
\9 The trial court ruled that because the uncontested facts demonstrated that the 
requirements of section 78B-3-421 were not met, the Agreement was not validly 
executed, and hence, is unenforceable. Dr. Bova challenges this conclusion on several 
grounds. 
A. Compliance with Section 78B-3-421(l)(c) 
110 Dr. Bova contends "that the Agreement complies with the legislatively 
established requirements to create a presumptively valid and enforceable agreement." 
He does not contest that Ms. Stewart was not verbally encouraged to read any materials 
or to ask any questions. Rather, he argues that ."[i]t. is simply nonsensical to hold an 
agreement unenforceable on the basis that only one of many statutory requirements 
designed to prevent misunderstanding of the terms of an Agreement was not met, when 
the Plaintiff clearly acknowledges that she understood the terms of the Agreement." In 
effect, Dr. Bova argues that where the objectives of the statute have been satisfied, 
substantial compliance was sufficient. 
111 "To interpret a statute, we always look first to the statute's plain language in an 
effort to give effect to the legislature's intent, to the degree it can be so discerned." In re 
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Olympus Constr., L.C, 2009 UT 29,110, 215 P.3d 129. In addition, "[w]hen interpreting 
a statute, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used each term 
advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning/7 Hutterv. Dig-It, 
Inc., 2009 UT 69,1 32, 219 P.3d 918. Moreover, "'effect must be given, if possible, to 
every word, clause and sentence of a statute . . . . No clause[,] sentence or word shall be 
construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction can be found which 
will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute/" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 
123,153, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 46:06 (4th ed. 1984)). 
112 Here/the language of the statute could not be more clear: "for a binding 
arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider to be validly 
executed . . . : (c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to: (i) read the [specified] 
written information . . . and the arbitration agreement; (ii) and ask any questions." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c) (2008). Ms. Stewart was not verbally encouraged to read 
the materials or to ask any questions. Accordingly, under the explicit terms of the 
statute, the Agreement was not validly executed. 
113 Dr. Bova contends that the acknowledgment signed by Ms. Stewart demonstrates 
that she understood the Agreement and had the opportunity to ask questions. Thus, he 
reasons, "the overall purpose of the statute" was fulfilled. Undoubtedly, the ultimate 
goal of this statutory provision is to ensure that the patient understands what she is 
signing and, to that end, has the opportunity to have her questions answered. However, 
the Legislature did not merely specify the goal; it also specified, in the clearest terms, 
the method by which that goal is to be attained. The statute commands, not that the 
patient reach an understanding of the Agreement, but rather that the patient's 
understanding be achieved by particular means, including being verbally encouraged to 
read the materials and to ask questions. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 
(2004) (holding that, while the Confrontation Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure 
reliability of evidence, it "commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination"); accord 
Gygi v. St George Surgical & Medical Center, L.P., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38290 (D. Utah) 
(holding that substantial compliance is insufficient given the "very specific terms" of a 
different subsection of this statute). 
114 Dr. Bova argues that this reading of the statute undermines the purpose of the 
statute because it would result in fewer arbitrations. He cites section 78B-3-421 as 
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evidence of "the Legislature's desire to encourage arbitration" in the medical 
malpractice context. The Legislature does in fact encourage medical malpractice 
arbitration. But the history of medical malpractice arbitration in Utah has been 
complicated, if not contentious, involving a delicate legislative balancing of competing 
interests. See, e.g., Soriano v. Graul, 2008 UT App 188, f 2,186 P.3d 960 (noting that the 
2004 statutory amendments came in "response to a public, outcry"); Daniel Nelson, 
Note, Recent Legislative Developments: Medical Dispute Resolution Amendments, 2005 Utah 
L. Rev. 387, 389 (describing public picketing against 2003 amendments.concerning 
arbitration). Section 78B-3-421's detailed requirements reflect careful balancing of the 
interests of health care providers and their patients. 
115 Requiring compliance with specific patient safeguards before an arbitration 
agreement is validly executed does create the possibility that some arbitration 
agreements will not be validly executed, and thus that some disputes will be litigated 
rather than arbitrated. We have every reason to believe the Legislature was well aware 
of this risk and enacted the patient safeguards notwithstanding it. See Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42,146,164 P.3d 
384 ("We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly. .. ." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we understand the purpose of the section to 
be to encourage arbitration when statutory safeguards have been observed, but not 
when those safeguards have been ignored. 
B. The Parol Evidence Rule 
^16 Dr. Bova further contends that Ms. Stewart's declarations are inadmissible parol 
evidence and that the trial court erred by relying on them to contradict the unambiguous 
terms of the Agreement. 
117 The parol evidence rule "operates, in the absence of fraud or other invalidating 
causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations, or 
statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated 
contract." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20,111,182 P.3d 326 (emphasis 
and internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, if a contract is integrated, parol evidence 
is admissible only to clarify ambiguous terms; it is not admissible to vary or contradict 
the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). However, "extrinsic evidence is appropriately considered, even in the face of 
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a clear integration clause, where the contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, 
lacking in consideration, or where a contract is voidable for fraud, mistake, or illegality/' 
Id. 115. "Such invalidating causes need not and commonly do not appear on the face of 
the writing." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 cmt. c (1981).. 
118 Noncompliance with section 78B-3-421 is just such an invalidating cause. Ms. 
Stewart alleges that Dr. Bova and his staff did not comply with the requirements of the 
statute. Compliance with statutory requirements is essential for a medical malpractice 
arbitration agreement to be "validly executed." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l) (2008).. 
Thus, Ms. Stewart is not attempting to vary or add to the terms of the Agreement, but 
to demonstrate that it was not validly executed, just as if she had alleged that the 
Agreement was "voidable for fraud, mistake, or illegality." Tangrm, 2008 UT 20,115. 
Accordingly, her testimony is not excluded by the parol evidence rule. 
C. Problems of Proof 
119 Finally, Dr. Bova contends that "[t]he burden of proving verbal encouragement 
by extrinsic evidence is nearly impossible to meet." "Absent a recording of the 
conversation," he reasons, "there is no way to positively prove that such a verbal 
exchange occurred," raising the specter of "dueling affidavits." Therefore, he concludes, 
reading the statute to require such proof would lead to "absurd consequences," State v. 
Redd, 1999 UT 108,112, 992 P.2d 986 (noting that statutes should be interpreted to 
avoid absurd consequences), and accordingly would not be a "reasonable and sensible 
construction," State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988)). 
120 To begin with, we do not agree that the plain language of section 78B-3-421(l)(c) 
places on health care providers a uniquely difficult—or even unusual—evidentiary 
burden. The evidentiary difficulties associated with proof of verbal encouragement are 
certainly no greater than those associated with other invalidating causes, such as where 
a contract is alleged to be "a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in consideration, or . . . 
voidable for fraud, mistake, or illegality." Tangren, 2008 UT 20,115. Moreover, 
knowing in advance that one might later be called upon to prove a particular fact is a 
great advantage to a potential litigant. Dr. Bova recognizes that various methods of 
proof are available, but contends that these methods are not feasible or fall short of 
positive proof. 
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121 We recognize that "a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its 
plain meaning works an absurd result/7 In re.Z.C, 2007 UT 54, JU, 165 P.3d 1206 
(internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, "[o]ur task is to interpret the 
words used by the legislature, not to correct or revise them/7 State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 
86,19, 150 P.3d 540. We do not agree that requiring health care providers to prove 
compliance with the arbitration statute's requirements by means normally employed to 
prove facts is a result ''so absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation 
could not have intended i t " In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, f 13. 
D. Unconscionability 
122 In the trial court, Ms. Stewart argued that, in addition to not being validly 
executed under section 78B-3-21, the Agreement was procedurally unconscionable due 
to the manner in which Dr. Bova's staff procured her signature on the document. 
Because the trial court ruled that the Agreement was unenforceable under section 78B-3-
421, it did not rule on whether it was procedurally unconscionable. Nevertheless, on 
appeal, Dr. Bova contends that the Agreement is not procedurally unconscionable under 
Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
123 Whether the Agreement suffers from procedural unconscionability or not, it is 
unenforceable under section 78B-3-421. Therefore, like the trial court, we have no need 
to address the question of unconscionability and decline to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
124 We affirm the trial court's ruling that the Agreement was not validly executed 
under section 78B-3-421 and is therefore unenforceable. We remand for further 
proceedings. 
J. Frederic Voros Jr., Judge 
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125 I CONCUR: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
126 I concur in the court's opinion. I write separately to comment on a point made in 
the lead opinion and to share a concern about the practical implications of the statutory 
requirement that patients be encouraged to ask questions before signing the arbitration 
agreement. 
127 The lead opinion observes that "[requiring compliance with specific patient 
safeguards before an arbitration agreement is validly executed does create the 
possibility that some arbitration agreements will not be validly executed, and thus that 
some disputes will be litigated rather than arbitrated/' Supra 115. While this may be 
true, it is not a function of the legislation but rather of lax practices on the part of health 
care providers. In other words, this is something entirely within the control of health 
care providers. They have the ability to make sure arbitration agreements are validly 
executed. And it is a simple matter to encourage a patient to read an arbitration 
agreement and to ask any questions.1 
1. Documenting statutory compliance is not overly burdensome. A recording could be 
made easily enough. But a checklist in which the patient checks and initials the 
provider's compliance with each required step would also be adequate, as would the 
patient's signing an affidavit or declaration outlining the steps that had been taken. 
Any hindrances to taking these measures are not inherent in the statutory scheme but 
rather are practical ones. Implementing such measures will slow down the processing 
of patients. Anticipating the possibility of malpractice and dwelling on the intricacies of 
arbitration may negatively affect provider-patient relations. And, of course, careful 
compliance with the statutory requirements may result in fewer acceptances of 
(continued...) 
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128 The Legislature's directive that a patient be encouraged to ask questions could 
not be more clear. And the provider in this case did not demonstrate compliance with 
this directive. While that ends our inquiry in this case, I do wonder what the point of 
the exercise is. In my experience, the arbitration agreement is just tucked into a packet 
that includes health questionnaires, insurance forms, privacy notices, etc. As such, it is 
handled by front office personnel, not the medical provider. But whether it is the 
receptionist, nurse, or doctor who encourages the patient to take a few minutes to 
carefully read the required statement and the agreement and then to ask any questions, I 
wonder if any of them are qualified to answer the questions that are germane: .Will I be 
as readily able to secure the services of an attorney if the case is arbitrated rather than 
handled in court? What are the differences in costs, including the cost of legal counsel, 
for arbitration versus traditional litigation? What are the differences in terms of both 
liability determinations and the range of monetary awards between malpractice cases 
adjudicated by arbitration tribunals and those adjudicated in court? Are there 
differences in the admissibility of evidence as between arbitration and a court 
proceeding? Which procedure is likely to be concluded more quickly? 
129 I'm guessing that when put to medical office personnel, such questions will 
invariably be met with blank stares, looks of astonishment, and candid answers of "I 
honestly don't know/7 If the goal of the Legislature is to make sure arbitration 
agreements are only entered into by fully informed patients-and that is the clear thrust 
of the statute-an opportunity to ask questions of someone not qualified to answer them 
may not be the best way to accomplish that goal. Perhaps a brochure that the patient 
would be encouraged to read would better serve the purpose. Patterned roughly after 
the familiar Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, it could begin with a neutral explanation 
of traditional litigation and arbitration, the statute authorizing malpractice arbitration 
agreements, and the steps required for entering into a valid arbitration agreement. This 
1. (...continued) 
arbitration, even as it makes rock-solid those acceptances that are given. 
Whether it is worth the trouble is up to the provider. The statute in question 
authorizes malpractice arbitration agreements if specific requirements are complied 
with. But such agreements are not mandated. I think that the policy of the statute is not 
to encourage the use of malpractice arbitration agreements per se, but rather to 
encourage their use only when they have been fully explained, are fully understood, and 
are acceptable to a fully-informed patient. 
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could be followed by a statement in favor of arbitration by, perhaps, the Utah Medical 
Association or the Utah Hospitals and Health Systems Association, and a statement 
against by, say, the Utah Association for Justice. 
130 True, fewer of the arbitration agreements would be signed. But those that were 
signed would be signed by people who understood what they were doing. And that 
seems to be the point of the statutory framework adopted by our Legislature. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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